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The beneficiary's bank and beneficiary
described by name and number: liability




Briefly stated, dismissal of the three claims in delict went to the merit of those
causes of action. The dismissal of two of the three claims in contract was
premised on rejecting the allegation that the instructions were clear and un-
ambiguous. That latter point does not require any further discussion. The
dismissal of the third contract claim, alleging instructions were unclear and
ambiguous, was premised on the lack of privity, an argument that in fact
applied to all three claims in contract. The question of the duty of Trust
Bank, as the beneficiary's bank, in relation to unclear and ambiguous instruc-
tions, was outside the scope of the judgment, and has become moot in light of
the ultimate holding. The balance of the discussion in this part will be con-
cerned with the delict and the contract privity issues. The duties of the bene-
ficiary's bank in respect of ambiguous payment orders will be dealt with in part
6 of this article.
In an interbank credit transfer the originator and beneficiary's bank do not
appear to be in a direct contractual relationship. Yet, they are still in some
proximity to each other. Hence, liability in delict by the beneficiary's bank to
the originator may superficially be attractive. A comparison between two
American pre-article 4A cases may demonstrate the point. Thus, in Securities
Fund Ser Inc v Am Nat'l Bank and Trust Co,73 as in Gilbey, having received a
payment order identifying the beneficiary by name and account number, the
beneficiary's bank processed the payment order solely on the basis of the
number; hence, it did not direct payment to the named beneficiary. 74 The court
found the beneficiary's bank liable to the originator on several alternative
theories, one of which was negligence.75 Conversely, in Bradford Trust Co of
Boston v Texas American Bank, the beneficiary's bank was not held liable to
the originator where, unlike in Gilbey and Securities Fund, the instructions,
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, Canada.
73 (n 5).
74 In Securities Fund, a dishonest employee of the originator fraudulently generated an authorised
payment order naming a legitimate beneficiary and an account number not belonging to that
beneficiary but to the dishonest employee's innocent creditor, to whom payment was ultimately
directed by the beneficiary's bank that did not verify the consistency between beneficiary's name
and number.
75 Other theories were direct liability of a principal to a sub-agent as well as to a third-party
beneficiary of the undertaking by beneficiary's bank to deliver funds as directed. For their
applicability under English and South African laws, see text and notes 95-101 below.




identifying the beneficiary by inconsistent name and account number, that
initiated the credit transfer, were forged. In such a case the purported origina-
tor, whose account was debited by the originator's bank, could recover from
the originator's bank for breach of contract. Reference was also made to the
failure of the originator's bank to follow its own internal procedures to verify
the genuineness of the payment order on which it acted. In the facts of the case,
it was the negligence of the originator's bank, and not the failure by the
beneficiary's bank to notice the discrepancy between name and number, that
was held to be the ultimate cause of the loss.
7 7
However, strictly speaking, Bradford need not necessarily be read to deny
altogether the existence of a cause of action in torts by the purported originator
of forged instructions against the beneficiary's bank. A direct Canadian pre-
cedent for the existence of such a cause of action is Vitalaire v Bank of Nova
Scotia.78 In that case, the Ontario superior court of justice "reluctantly
' 79
dismissed a motion to strike a statement of claim, on the grounds that it did
not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The judgment dealt with an action
against the beneficiary's bank by a customer of the originator's bank that
denied the origination of the funds transfer debited to that customer's account.
More specifically, the court dealt with a part of an action that had been
brought by a purported originator against the beneficiary's bank. The latter
credited the beneficiary's account pursuant to genuine payment instructions
received from another bank that executed instructions that purported to ema-
nate from the originator, but that were alleged to be forged. In carrying out
these fraudulent instructions the originator's bank debited the originator's
account that thus suffered loss.
80
The purported originator's action alleged breach of duty of care, as well as
breach of a fiduciary duty by the beneficiary's bank. Alleged breach was in
connection with the opening of the account without verifying the character of
the would-be beneficiary and the legitimacy of its business as well as in not
inquiring into the unusually large size of the transfer. The court treated the
claim as one for pure economic loss, and thus insisted that "it must be sub-
jected to stringent tests" that "require findings of foreseeability of the loss,
proximity in the relationship of the parties, and a policy analysis that ade-
quately recognises the dangers of indeterminate liability, multiplicity of inap-
77 Bradlbrd involved forged instructions transmitted to the originator's bank, fraudulently
identifying the beneficiary by inconsistent name and account number. The beneficiary's bank
placed the funds in the account as identified by number, thereby implementing the forger's
fraudulent intent. As in Securities Fund, the account identified by number belonged to an
innocent creditor of the fraudulent employee, except that, unlike in both Securities Fund and
Gilbey, instructions were unauthorised. They identified beneficiary by name (being in fact the
purported originator) and account number. Payment was made by the beneficiary's bank to the
unsuspecting creditor's account without verifying consistency between beneficiary's name and
number.
78 court file no 02-CV-224459CM3 Dec 16 2002 (Pitt J) unreported.
79 Viltalaire (n 78) 32.
"0 In fact, action was brought also against the originator's bank (Bank of Nova Scotia), the
beneficiary (Universal) as well as against Royal Bank of Canada, whose role in the transfer is not
indicated in the court's decision that was limited to the availability of a cause of action against
the beneficiary's bank (Bank of Montreal). The report does not state whether the beneficiary's
bank acted on instructions received directly from the originator's bank or from an intermediary
bank. However, in the context of the particular issue, nothing turned on this.
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propriate lawsuits, and the plaintiff's duty to protect itself against inherent
business risks through insurance."
8 1
The court thought that all these tests have been met. In doing so, it char-
acterised the issue as involving the obligation of a bank ("Bank B") to prevent
its use by its customer to defraud a customer of another bank ("Bank A").
Particularly, the court relied on cases holding for banks' duty of care to non-
customers generally in opening accounts for their own customers, and specifi-
cally when confronted with circumstances so unusual or strange as to put a
"reasonable banker" on his or her guard.8 2 This situation may however be
distinguishable from that in Gilbey. Moreover, Vitalaire may have been
wrongly decided; in the final analysis, the logic of Bradford is much more
compelling. Indeed, cases cited by the court in Vitalaire are quite distinguish-
able. In all of them, the fraudulent instructions were given by the defrauder
directly to the defrauder's bank, that is "Bank B," rather than to the bank of
the injured party, that is, "Bank A". All cases involved cheques rather than
wire transfers, in circumstances where there was no alleged breach of duty by
the bank of the injured party ("Bank A"), so that contract remedy was of no
avail to that party. As was held in Gilbey,8 3 though only in the context of the
remedy against the collecting bank,8 4 in the cheque situation, the contractual
framework is inadequate to fasten liability on "Bank B" that dealt directly with
the defrauder. Conversely, in the credit transfer setting, the defrauder dealt
directly with "Bank A," which has a contractual relationship with the injured
party. Consequently, as in Bradford, the sequence of contracts affords the
allocation of the loss to "Bank A" that dealt directly with the defrauder, so
far as the act of fraud is concerned.
Nevertheless, unlike Vitalaire, Gilbey involved genuine originator's instruc-
tions, so that the originator in Gilbey had no cause of action against the
originator's bank for the latter's own breach. It is may thus be tempting to
argue that a cause of action in delict against a defaulting beneficiary's bank
appears to be justified in Gilbey, even more than in Vitalaire. Yet, upon reflec-
tion, to condemn tort liability in Vitalaire is not necessarily to justify liability in
delict in Gilbey. Thus, an owner of a stolen cheque and a bank that collected it
for the thief are complete strangers. In essence, the same is true also with
regard to an account holder who did not instruct payment out of the account,
and a beneficiary's bank, to whom funds were transferred out the account.
Such an account holder is not an originator of a funds transfer and thus, vis-d-
vis the beneficiary's bank of the unauthorised funds transfer, is a complete
stranger. An action in tort by that account holder against the beneficiary's
bank is to be disfavoured, not because they are less strangers to each other
than the true owner of a stolen cheque and the collecting bank; rather, as
sI Vitalaire (n 78) 4-5.
12 Cases relied on by the court are Semac Industries v 1131426 Ontario Ltd [2001] OJ No 3443
(SC.); Lumsden and Co v London Trustee Savings Bank [1971] 1 Lloyd's LR 114 (QB) (for which
the volume is erroneously cited as [1997]); J& F Transport v Makiiart (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 204
(Sask QB); and Richmond Raiders Football Club v Richmond Savings Credit Union [1993] BCJ No
449 (BCSC).
83 See text at n 76-78 above.
14 Interestingly enough, three of the four cases relied on by the court and cited in n 82 above
involved fraud by a depositor dealing with the collecting bank. Only Semac dealt with a drawer's
fraud dealing with the drawee bank.
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indicated, the action of account holder who did not authorise payment against
the beneficiary's bank is to be disfavoured because the account holder may
recover, in contract, from the originator's bank, in which the account holder's
account is maintained, and from which the unauthorised transfer originated.
No such option is available to the true owner of the cheque, who has no cause
of action, in contract or otherwise, against the true owner's bank.
The position of an originator who instructed payment out of the originator's
account, vis-d-vis the beneficiary's bank, is however quite distinguishable from
that of the account holder who did not authorise payment towards the bene-
ficiary's bank, as well as that of the true owner of the cheque towards the
collecting bank. A beneficiary's bank designated by the originator in the pay-
ment order that initiated the transfer, or even an intermediary's bank not
designated by the originator, while each is not strictly speaking, in privity
with the originator, is not a complete stranger to the originator. It is more
appropriate to resolve disputes between each such bank and the originator on
the basis of the law that governs rights of participants in the credit transfer
rather than under principles of law governing duties to strangers. To that end,
delict may be even less justifiable in Gilbey (where the account holder in-
structed payment) than in Vitalaire (where the account holder did not instruct
payment). Hence, as in Bradford and as should have been the case in Vitalaire,
but notwithstanding Securities Fund to the contrary,8 5 1 agree with the disposi-
tion by the court in Gilbey of the claims in delict.
In dismissing the claims in delict, the court in Gilbey properly rejected Gil-
beys' claim based on property in the funds received by Trust Bank and/or the
existence of a fiduciary duty owed by Trust Bank to Gilbeys. In the course of
its analysis, the court added however, that
"[a]lthough a bank may clearly act as a mandatary and may incur liability to its customer for
consequential damages as a result of it failing in its duties in that regard, it is difficult to conceive
of an action for damages in respect of a failure of a bank to credit a customer's account. The
very essence of banking law runs contrary to this. As [sic] customer's action will simply be an
action of debt."-
8 6
But surely, this statement, insofar as its second part appears to deny the pos-
sibility of liability of a bank for losses incurred by the failure to credit custo-
mer's account, cannot be taken at face value. Rather, its second part must be
understood as limited to state the obvious, namely, that so far as the debtor-
creditor relation between the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary is con-
cerned, the former incurs no liability to the latter other than on the debt,
and not in damages.8 7 In other words, taken as a whole, the statement ought
not to be taken to deny the possibility that the failure of a bank to credit
customer's account may lead to various types of losses to the customer, such
as decline of credit rating, failure to comply with net worth requirements,
bank's refusal to execute payments on behalf of the customer, or wrongful
dishonour of cheques drawn on the account. In principle, and subject to
15 For Vitalaire, Bradford, and Securities Fund respectively see text at n 78-82, 76-77 and 73-75
above.
16 Gilbey (n 7) 72.
17 For the doctrinal distinction, in historical perspective, between liability on a debt and for
damages for the breach of contract, see Levontin "Debt and contract in the common law" (1966)
1 Is L Rev 60.
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normal rules as to foreseeability, all such losses are recoverable. Nonetheless,
and this is the point to be attributed to the court, their recovery is not a matter
of delict, and is premised neither on proprietary interest in the funds nor on a
fiduciary duty with respect to them. And of course, their recovery is not on the
basis of the debt relationship. Rather, such losses are recoverable on breach of
contract; in fact, as was acknowledged by the court in the first part of its
statement, the contract is that of mandate. No contract between Trust Bank
and Gilbeys as its customer, or the beneficiary of the credit transfer, was found
to exist. Hence, the court was correct in declining to find liability for conse-
quential damages.
It is then the question as to lack of a claim in contract by Gilbeys, as the
originator of the credit transfer, which is at the crux of the matter. As recalled,
Gilbeys' first alternative claim in contract was premised on what was alleged to
be the "proper construction" of the instructions contained in the transaction
documents as establishing a direct contractual relationship between it, as the
originator of the funds transfer, and Trust Bank as the beneficiary's bank.8 9
For each set of instructions, the court understood the contract pleaded to be
not of a mandate or agency, 90 but rather, a contract of deposit, establishing a
debtor and creditor relationship between Gilbeys and Trust Bank. Under this
analysis, such a contract is concluded by the acceptance by Trust Bank of
Gilbeys' written offer communicated to Trust Bank, through the agency of
FNB, over each set of a credit transfer form and a clearance voucher. Under
each such an alleged contract, "Trust Bank agreed to hold the amount in
question for the benefit-or in the account of Gilbeys and not to credit the
Fundstrust account bearing the number indicated in the credit transfer
form". 9 1 As further recalled, in disposing of the first alternative claim in con-
tract, the court held against the alleged "proper construction" of the docu-
ments but did not specifically reject this direct debtor-creditor theory. 92 At the
same time, in upholding the exception directed against the third alternative
claim in contract, premised on the ambiguity of the transaction documents and
Trust Bank's alleged duty to inquire into their exact meaning, the court agreed
with Trust Bank's two-fold submission that "an offer to enter into a debtor/
creditor relationship can hardly be described as 'instructions",) as well as "that
there can be scarcely be a contractual duty in an offeree to inquire into the
exact meaning of an offer". Therefore, the court concluded, "the contract
relied upon under the [third alternative claim in contract] is capable of only
one construction, namely that it is a contract of mandate". To that end, "FNB
did not become the representative of Gilbeys. When FNB executed the instruc-
tion to transfer it functioned as a mere mandatary".
93
I submit that if there is no direct contractual relationship on the basis of
88 For a codification of circumstances where such liability may arise, see UCC section 4A-404(a)
and Official comment 2.
The first alternative claim was formulated in par 8 to 15 of the particulars of the claim, set out on
14 of the judgment and discussed by the court on 20-40 (the Gilbey case (n 7)).
90 Therefore, in this context, the court avoided discussing the issue as to whether the beneficiary's
bank is to be regarded a mandatary, sub-mandatary, or substitute mandatary for the originator
or originator's bank.
91 (n 7) 26.
92 For the first alternative claim in contract, see text around n 46-52, above.
93 (n 7) 54, 55 and 58. For the third alternative in contract, see text around n 55-63 above.
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ambiguous transaction documents (third alternative contract claim), no such
contract can be stated to exist on the basis of "properly construed" transaction
documents (first alternative contract claim). Stated otherwise, the rejection of
the existence of such a contract in the former case (third alternative) must be
taken to apply in the latter (first alternative) as well; the existence of a direct
contractual relationship cannot be said to depend on lack of ambiguity in the
transaction documents. Indeed, in rejecting a direct contractual relationship
between the originator and the beneficiary's bank in a funds transfer, the
court's mandate analysis is fully in line with both English banking law as
well as South African mandate law. 94 Yet, as a matter of pure legal doctrine,
such a direct contract is not an impossibility; in an appropriate case of an
interbank transfer, one can view the originator's instructions to the originator's
bank as a mandate to transfer funds pts an offer to be passed on to the
beneficiary's bank to keep funds for the originator upon their arrival to
the beneficiary's bank. Upon receiving the message and accepting the offer, the
beneficiary's bank is then to be charged with a duty to ascertain its exact
meaning.
Indeed, so far as English law is concerned, the orthodox position under
which no privity of contract exists between a principal and sub-agent has
not remained unchallenged; it was disfavoured in the United States, 95 and
was made in English law subject to exceptions. 96 It was thus recognised that
privity of contract between a principal and sub-agent may exist when such
privity is intended by either principal or agent. 97 On occasion, it may also be
possible to view the contract between agent and sub-agent as one for the
benefit of the principal so as to allow the latter to enforce it. 98 It was also
specifically observed that a leading case as to the lack of liability in negligence
by the sub-agent to the principal was decided prior to the emergence of modern
law of negligence. 99 At the same time, it must be observed, establishing privity,
or a direct principal-agent relationship, between the principal and sub-agent,
will not universally benefit the principal. For example, if they are in a direct
relationship, a principal may be held liable to the sub-agent for the sub-agent's
commissions and fees promised to the sub-agent by the agent.100 As well,
94 See text around n 29-37 above and text immediately below.
95 See Seavey "Subagents and subservants" 1955 Hari L Rev 658, particularly 666-667. For a
modern authority, see eg, United Capitol Ins Co v Kapiloff 155 F 3d 488, 498 (4th Cir 1998) citing
Restatement (Second) Agency par 428(1) for the proposition that "[a] subagent who knows of
the existence of the ultimate principal owes him the duties owed by an agent to a principal".
96 See in general Reynolds Bowistead and Reynolds on Agency (2001) 140-145.
97 De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286, 310.
98 Under s I of the Contracts (Rights (f Third Parties) Act 1999 Chapter c 31. Note however that
for the statute to apply, while under s 1(1) enforceability by the third party needs not be explicitly
provided for by the contract, s 1(3) requires that the "[t]he third party must be expressly
identified in the contract by name, as a member of a class or as answering a particular
description". As a rule, a payment order issued either to an intermediary bank or to the
beneficiary bank will identify the originator by name so as to satisfy s 1(3). For contracts for the
benefit of a third party under South African law see eg, Christie The Lais of Contract in South
Africa (2001) 300-311 and Kerr The Principles of the Laiw of" Contracts (2002) 85-94.
99 Reynolds (n 96) 143 identifying Calico Printers Assn Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd(1931) 145 LT 51 as
the leading case for the lack of duty of care of the sub-agent to the principal, preceding the
seminal negligence tort case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
100 Cf Winners Development Ltd v Goddard and Smith International Realty Inc (1992) 68 BCLR (2d)
285 (SC) in Canada, in which the principal escaped such liability to the sub-agent on the basis of
lack of privity.
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arguably, in defending the principal's action, the sub-agent may anyway be
able to rely on a disclaimer of liability clause in the agent's contract with the
principal.' To that end, other than when no action is available to the princi-
pal against the agent, it is hard to justify the elimination of strict privity
requirements to the position of the principal upon the default of the sub-agent
so as to allow the principal to recover from the sub-agent. Particularly in the
banking context, general principles of law applicable to general, and by-and-
large frequent, situations, are not to be precipitated by the specific scenario of
the less frequent situation of agent's insolvency.
In the final analysis, the recourse of the originator, in case of a default by the
beneficiary's bank, whether against the beneficiary's bank itself, or the origi-
nator's bank as vicariously liable for the default by the beneficiary's bank,
depends on the relative positions of the parties in the transaction. The court's
characterisation of the beneficiary's bank as a sub-mandatary for the origina-
tor, not in privity with it and hence, in principle, not liable to it, ought thus to
be examined.
It has long been established at common law that "the relation between
banker and customer, so far as the pecuniary dealings are concerned, [is]
that of a debtor and creditor". 10 2 Money to the credit of the customer can
be placed by the customer or by a third party, 10 3 usually the debtor of the
customer. Regardless from whom it is received, "the money placed in the
custody of the banker is the money of the banker" who is obligated "to repay
to the [customer] when demanded, a sum equivalent to that paid into his
hands". 104
It follows that payment by a third-party payor into the customer's bank ac-
count is in effect a mode of discharging the payor's obligation to the customer
by constituting the bank a debtor to the payee-customer, in lieu of the payor, in
respect of the sum payable. 10 5 Accordingly, an obligation to make "payment in
cash" into a designated bank account may be discharged not only by means of
the delivery of bank notes and coins to the bank, but also by means of "any
commercially recognized method of transferring funds, the result of which is to
give the transferee the unconditional right to the immediate use of the funds
transferred". 10 6 In this context, "unconditional" was construed by the house of
lords to mean "unfettered and unrestricted".
10 7
For deposited funds, bank's indebtedness to the customer arises as early as
in connection with the receipt of funds by the bank,10 8 and not as late as when
101 A question that was bypassed in Calico (n 99), where the action of the principal against the sub-
agent was dismissed for lack of privity so that the question of the scope of the disclaimer clause
in favour of the agent in its contract with the principal did not arise.
102 Foley i' Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28 at 45; 9 ER 1002 1009, per Lord Campbell.
103 (n 102) 2 HLC 28 43; 9 ER 1002 1008.
104 (n 102) 2 HLC 28 36-37; 9 ER 1002 1005-1006, per Lord Cotteham LC.
1o5 King "The receiving bank's role in credit transfer transactions" (1982) 45 Mod L Rev 369 381.
106 The Brimnes, Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v The Brimnes (Owners) [1973] 1 All ER 769 (QB) 782
per Barndon J; qff'd [1974] 3 All ER 88 (CA).
107 A!S Awilco 1 Fuvia S.p.A Di Navigazione (The Chikuma) [1981] Lloyd's LR 371 (HL) 375.
10 For a general statement to that effect, see eg Royal Products (n 40) 198-199, per Webster J. See
also Afbios v Shipping Co SAv R Pagnan and F Li (The "Aibvos") [1980] 2 Lloyd's LR 469
(QB) 473 per Lloyds LJ; rs'd [1982] 3 All ER 18 (CA); aff'd [1983] 1 All ER 449 (HL).
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credit is posted to the account, not to mention the moment when beneficiary is
advised of the payment. 109 In the context of payment by credit transfer, funds
may typically be received by a beneficiary's bank by various means, l 0 such as
an interbank funds-transfer system, 111 credit posted to the account of the
beneficiary's bank with the sending bank,1 12 or debit posted by the benefi-
ciary's bank to the sender's account maintained on the books of the benefi-
ciary's bank. 113 The time payment occurs in the context of such banking
processes is beyond the scope of this article.' However, what is important
to note is that occurrence of payment from the originator to the beneficiary is
linked to the receipt of funds by the beneficiary's bank and not the posting of
credit to the beneficiary's account on the basis of receipt of such funds.'11
Risk of delay or loss at the beneficiary's bank thus falls on the beneficiary.
This is quite fair; after all, it was the beneficiary who designated, and chose to
deal with the beneficiary's bank. It is for this reason that it may be appropriate
to treat both the acceptance of payment and the banking operation of placing
it at the beneficiary's disposal by crediting the beneficiary's account as carried
out by the beneficiary's bank for the beneficiary; 1 16 having been discharged of
the debt owed to the beneficiary upon the receipt of funds by the beneficiary's
bank, the originator rightly lost interest in the ensuing process. 117 As the agent
of the beneficiary, the beneficiary's bank may be sued by the originator or
109 Earlier cases to the contrary, such as Eyles v Ellis (1827) 4 Bing 112 at 113; 130 ER 710 at 711,
per Best CJ (requiring funds to actually be placed in the account) and Rekstin r Serero Sibirsko
[1933] 1 KB 47 (CA) 57 per Talbot .1 (going further and requiring actual advice to the
beneficiary) were either overruled or distinguished in Momn v Barclays Bank International Ltd
[1976] 3 All ER 588 (QB) 597 per Kerr J.
110 For an overview of means of transfers, see eg Libran Arab Foreign Bank (n 39) 273-276 and 280-
283.
1]1 See eg, Delbrueck v Manan cturers Hanover Trust Co 609 F 2d 1047 (2d Cir 1979), dealing with
an interbank payment over the New York-based CHIPS.
112 See eg, The Afovos (n 108) and Royal Products (n 40) (though in the later case the account was
opened by the sending bank for the purpose of carrying out this particular transfer). See also
Zim Israel Navigation Co Ltd v EJfJy Shipping Corp (The Effh); [1972] 1 Lloyd's LR 18 (QB).
See eg, The Brinies (n 106), as well as n 120 below.
114 Under the American UCC, the question is governed by s 4A-403, discussed by Geva "Interbank
settlement in wire transfers legal aspects" 2003 UCCLJ 47 64-71.
5 In fact, this is also the position in the US under UCC article 4A. See s 4A- 104(a), -406, and
209(b) and (c), under which a funds transfer is completed and the debt of the originator to the
beneficiary is discharged upon acceptance by the beneficiary's bank which may be marked by
the receipt of payment by the beneficiary's bank. Crediting the beneficiary's account marks
"acceptance" and hence completion and discharge only when credit is posted prior to the receipt
of funds.
116 A leading case for the limited authority of the beneficiary's bank to receive payment for the
beneficiary and credit the beneficiary's account (but not to make commercial decisions on the
beneficiary's behalf such as to waive a delay in payment) is Mardorf Peach and Co v Attica Sea
Carriers Corp of Liberia, The Laconia [1977] 1 All ER 545 (HL),judgments of Lord Wilberforce
(with whom Lord Simon agreed) and Lord Salmon. See also Royal Products (n 40) 198-199,
ANZ Banking Group v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 78 ALR 157 (Aus HC) (commented
on by Luntz, (1988-9) 3 BFLR 363), as well as (in the US prior to UCC article 4A) Delbrueck (n
111) 1051-52.
117 Notwithstanding King (n 105) 373, my view is that it is off the point that in placing the funds at
the beneficiary's disposal by crediting the beneficiary's account, the beneficiary's bank does not
necessarily act as the beneficiary's agent. Agency or mandate may be limited to the receipt of
payment (possibly in discharge of a debt) and, in any event, in crediting the account the
beneficiary's bank acts for the beneficiary, under a contract with the beneficiary (even if not as
the beneficiary's agent) and not as the sender or originator.
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sender in restitution, for funds mistakenly sent and still kept with it l l8 but not
on the basis of liability stemming from its own breach.' 1
There is however also authority to the effect that in acting on a payment
order received from a sender, the beneficiary's bank acts to carry out its sen-
der's instructions, so as to put it in a contractual relationship with it in regard
to instructions that purport to implement the originator's payment order. This
appears to favour the treatment of the beneficiary's bank as a sub-agent or sub-
mandatary of the originator, or where privity restrictions have been held not to
apply, even in privity with the originator, whose specific instructions are at the
root of what is carried out by beneficiary's bank.
120
In my view, these two positions are not necessarily conflicting. Nor is any
,metamorphosis' necessarily involved in the position of the beneficiary's
bank.12 1 Rather, in acting on a payment order instructing payment to its
customer, the beneficiary's bank may be seen as acting under both contracts,
the one with the sender, and the other with the beneficiary. Yet, in case of an
overlap in its obligations, it is the contract with the beneficiary that supersedes
the contract with the sender. At the same time, there may be situations where
no such overlap exists, in which case the beneficiary's bank is to be considered
under its contract with the sender. Particularly, such would be the case where
the beneficiary is not a customer of the beneficiary's bank, where there is no
subsisting beneficiary's account into which funds may be deposited, or else,
where the beneficiary is non-existing or unidentifiable. Otherwise in the latter
case, the beneficiary's bank will be acting for nobody, which is inconceivable.
Alternatively, if a choice must be made, the beneficiary's bank is to be seen
as acting exclusively for the beneficiary, in which case the originator's payment
order is to be understood as instructing payment to be directed to the bene-
ficiary's bank as the beneficiary's agent, rather than as designating the bene-
ficiary's bank as the originator's agent instructed to make payment to the
beneficiary. However, this interpretation could hold true only as long as the
beneficiary's bank is in fact the beneficiary's agent, which can be the case only
where the beneficiary holds a subsisting account with the beneficiary's bank,
122
or otherwise nominated the beneficiary's bank to obtain funds on the benefi-
ciary's behalf. Where this is not the case, as, for example, where the beneficiary
11' See ANZ v Westpac (n 116).
119 Accordingly, where funds are deposited not as instructed, recovery from the beneficiary's bank
is by the beneficiary of the credit transfer on breach of contract, or even on constructive trust,
by a third party (such as a secured party of the beneficiary), claiming a beneficial interest in the
funds to be deposited to a designated account.
120 For the beneficiary's bank as the sub-agent of the originator, see eg obiter in The Brimnes,
Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v Owners of the motor vessel Brimnes [1974] 3 All ER 88 (CA) 99; aff'd
[1973] 1 All ER 769. For a scholarly support, coupled with rejecting the position that the
beneficiary's bank is an agent for the beneficiary, see King (n 105) 373, 379, and 381. The
characterisation was disfavoured in Shairmut Worcester County v First American Bank and
Trust Co 731 F Supp 57 at 60-61 (D Mass 1990). For the beneficiary's bank as a sub-agent of the
originator in a fact situation quite similar to that of Gilbey, see Securities Fund (n 5), discussed
in the text at n 73-75, holding the beneficiary's bank directly liable to the originator as sub-
agent, in negligence, or under a contract for the benefit of a third party.
121 As argued by Ellinger, Lomnicka and Hooley Modern Banking Low (2002) 507.
122 That is, typically, and subject to a customer's right to promptly reject an unauthorised deposit
to the customer's account (as in The Laconia (n 116)), maintaining an account on the books of
the beneficiary's bank is to be considered as an authority to receive payment.
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is not a customer of the beneficiary's bank, where there is no subsisting ben-
eficiary's account into which funds may be deposited, or else, where the ben-
eficiary is non-existing or unidentifiable, the beneficiary's bank cannot be
treated as acting for the beneficiary; hence it must be taken as acting for its
sender.
There is no practical difference between these two modes of analysis; 123 in the
absence of agency for the beneficiary, the beneficiary's bank is to be regarded as
acting for its sender. Thus in Gilbey, if the beneficiary is to be viewed as non-
existing or unidentifiable, so that Trust Bank cannot be viewed as having acted
for any customer or beneficiary at the receiving end, it must be that it acted for the
sender. It is in this context that Trust Bank can be viewed as a sub-agent or sub-
mandatary of Gilbeys, as in fact pointed out by the court. 124 Yet, as indicated,
under this analysis, it is not even all that implausible to regard a beneficiary's
bank to be in direct contractual relationship with the originator, at least on the
basis of the instructions to deposit funds in an account maintained on the books
of the beneficiary's bank. This result may be more appealing than allowing the
originator to sue the originator's bank for the default of the beneficiary's bank, a
sub-agent designated by the originator. 1
25
If there was a breach of duty by Trust Bank, as a matter of sound policy, it
may be reasonable to release both Trust Bank from direct liability to Gilbeys
and FNB from liability to Gilbeys for Trust Bank's default, only if Gilbeys is
entitled to recover from FNB on the basis of a "money-back guarantee" for a
funds transfer that has not been completed as instructed. Such an action is
available under UCC article 4A, 12 6 but not at common law. Thus, in the
absence of any action against the banks, the alleged breach by Trust Bank,
which had substantially contributed to the loss, would have remained without
legal consequences, as Trust Bank would not be answerable to anyone. Breach
without a remedy is something to be avoided; hence, a legal analysis leading to
such a conclusion ought to be discouraged. To that end, upon the default by
Trust Bank, either FNB or Trust Bank must have been held liable to Gilbeys.
The key is then the existence of default by Trust Bank by reference to a duty
to match a name and number or otherwise ascertain the identity of the bene-
ficiary. It is only if such a duty exists, and that it was in fact broken, that the
beneficiary of Gilbeys' payment order can be regarded as non-existing or uni-
dentifiable. Moreover, if such a duty exists, and has been broken, Trust Bank is
liable, either directly to Gilbeys, or through its obligation to reimburse FNB
that is answerable to Gilbeys for the default of Trust Bank.
123 With the same result effectively achieved in the US under UCC article 4A, notwithstanding the
fact that, under s 4A-212, "A receiving bank is not the agent of the sender or the beneficiary of
the payment order it accepts". Thus, under s 4A-209(b) and (c), acceptance by a beneficiary's
bank for a payment order received for an account-holding customer may be constituted by the
receipt of payment from the sender. Otherwise, under s 4A-207(c), there is no acceptance by the
beneficiary's bank for a beneficiary who has no bank account by means of receipt of payment
from the sender, and there is no acceptance whatsoever for a nonexistent beneficiary under s
4A-207(a).
124 (n 7) 60 and see text at n 62 above.
125 C'fthe position under UCC s 4A-402(c) and (e) under which the "money-back guarantee" of the
originator's bank to the originator arising upon the non-completion of the funds transfer (see
text around n 30 above) does not apply where the transfer has not been completed due to
suspension of payments by an intermediary bank designated by the originator.
126 s 4A-402(c), discussed in text around n 29-30 above.
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6 Duties of beneficiary's bank in relation to unclear and ambiguous
instructions
At first blush, UCC article 4A appears to bypass the issue of duties of benefi-
ciary's bank in relation to unclear and ambiguous instructions. This tentative
conclusion can be drawn from the language of section 4A-207(a) that categori-
cally provides that, in principle, "if in a payment order received by the benefi-
ciary's bank, the name, bank account number, or other identification of the
beneficiary refers to a nonexistent or unidentifiable person or account, no person
has rights as a beneficiary of the order and acceptance of the order cannot occur".
Yet, upon reflection, whether a beneficiary is "unidentifiable" ought to be deter-
mined under that provision by reference to the duties of the beneficiary's bank in
relation to the ambiguity that necessitates identification. It was held in this con-
text that identification can be made "in any number of ways including the plain
wording of the [payment] order or the circumstances of the transfer".' 2 Yet, case
law dealing with the interpretation of UCC §4A-207(a) appears to me unsatisfac-
tory, 128 focusing on its plain wording, particularly on its disjunctive language,
129
rather than on enhancing a desirable loss allocation scheme.' 30 Jurisprudence
other than under UCC article 4A may thus be more helpful.
In the United States, prior to UCC article 4A, Walker v Texas Commerce
Bank 131 stated that in receiving a payment order from a sender, a receiving
bank is under a duty "to implement commercially reasonable internal procedures
designed to process [a payment order] in accordance with [the sender's] instruc-
tions, to verify the accuracy of, and compliance with, instructions, to detect and
minimize inaccuracy, and to act diligently to remedy errors". 132 This is quite in
line with the receiving bank's duty, as a mandatary 13 or agent, "to use reason-
able care and skill" in carrying out a payment order, as set out in RoyalProducts v
Midland Bank. 134 This applies to the beneficiary's bank as the last receiving bank
in the chain of participants in a credit transfer. I will examine now the implemen-
tation of this standard in the circumstances of Gilbey.
In Gilbey, each credit transfer was carried out by means of a credit transfer
form and clearance voucher issued by FNB to Trust Bank. 135 Arguably, for
each transfer, between the two documents, it is the credit transfer form that
was to be acted by Trust Bank in directing payment. On its part, being a mere
acknowledgement of funds held for settlement, and not even designating a
beneficiary's account, the clearance voucher served to facilitate the resulting
interbank settlement for each payment carried out on the basis of the credit
transfer form. In the facts of the case, as hinted by the court, the five credit
transfer forms received by Trust Bank and identifying the beneficiary by Funds-
127 Donmar Enterprises lnc v Southern National Bank of North Carolina (1993) 828 F Supp 1230
(WDNC) 1239-40; afJ"d (1995) 64 F 3d 944 (4th Cir NC)
128 See the discussion in Geva Bank Collections (n 8) 529-535.
129 See eg, Corfan Banco Asunci(in v Ocean Bank (1998) 715 So 2d 967 (Fla Dist Ct App), where the
provision was applied in the case of a payment order directing payment to an existing
beneficiary properly identified by name though by a non-existing account number.
130 See the dissent (n 129) at 969 at n 4.
131 635 F Supp 678 (SD Tex 1986).
132 (n 131) 682.
133 For the mandatary's obligations in South Africa, see eg Joubert and Van Zyl (n 37) 9-15.
134 (n 40) 198.
13 For the facts, see the text around n 12-18 above.
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trust's account number and "Trust Bank (Gilbeys)" were amenable to the
interpretation of instructing payment to Fundstrust's account at Trust Bank
for the benefit of Gilbeys.136 Such interpretation would have exonerated Trust
Bank, which could only control the direction of the funds to Funds trust, and
had no power whatsoever as to the subsequent disposition of the proceeds at
Fundstrust's end. 137
Unfortunately, the very little direct jurisprudence available from various
countries may lend only limited support to this type of analysis.' 38 Thus, a
beneficiary's bank may reject an unclear or ambiguous payment order. None-
theless, ambiguity ought to be somewhat significant; thus, a beneficiary's bank
was held to be in breach in rejecting a payment order properly identifying the
beneficiary by name, but misidentifying the beneficiary's account by omitting
one digit from the account number. 139 At the same time, in case of ambiguity
that cannot be described as trivial or insignificant, a beneficiary's bank was not
allowed much discretion, notwithstanding good faith and reasonable efforts of
identification.
Thus, in discharge of its duties as a mandatary or agent, not having rejected
an ambiguous payment order, the beneficiary's bank is bound to exercise due
diligence in identifying and locating the beneficiary. 140 Jurisprudence fastened
on a bank endeavouring to identify the beneficiary quite a high standard.
Having attempted to rectify an error or ambiguity in a payment order it re-
ceived, a beneficiary's bank may be held to be in breach, when it acted other
than on the basis of the sender's explicit and unequivocal advice, in connection
with an ambiguous payment order susceptible of more than one plausible
interpretation, and hence, amenable to alternative courses of action. 14 1 Ac-
cordingly, it was held that a beneficiary's bank did not act diligently, and
thus was in breach, in each of the following cases:
(a) The beneficiary's bank received a payment order directing payment into a
designated account of "Lynwil". There was no such customer on the books
of the branch and the designated account belonged to another company
that had several accounts at the branch, one of which under the trade name
of "Linwell". The branch thus credited that other company's account. 142
136 See Gilbey (n 7) 39 and the discussion in the text around n 44-45 above.
137 as in Tzaras (n 33).
13" To a large extent, the ensuing discussion summarises Geva Bank Collections (n 8) 519-28.
139 See eg, in Canada, Tafreschi v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1986] BCJ No 2096
(BCSC).
140 See eg, in Canada, Poluck v Canadian Imperial Bank (f Commerce [1981] CA 587 (Que). For a
discussion from Belgian perspective, see eg Thunis Responsabilit du banquier et automitisation
des paiemnts (1996) 141-147, particularly 142; and Bruyneel "Le Virement" in Winandy et al
(eds) La Banque dans /a vie quotidienne (1986) 345 at 430-442, particularly 439-440.
141 It ought to be observed that, unlike a beneficiary's bank in a credit transfer, a depositary bank
in the cheque collection can draw conclusions as to the intended payee/holder from the fact that
the latter is in possession of the cheque. Due to the different operation of the credit "push"
mechanism (see above, first par of this article), no similar guidance is available to the
beneficiary's bank.
142 Canadian case of Royal Bank of Canada v Stangl [1992] OJ No 378; on-line: QL(O.); No29464/
88 (Gen Div), unreported. The judgment is reproduced in Geva Negotiable Instruments and
Banking 621, being vol II of Ziegel, Geva and Cuming Commercial and Consumer Transactions
Cases, Text and Materials (1995). The case is critically re-examined in text around n 171-172
below.
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(b) The beneficiary's bank received a payment order directing payment into a
designated account of "Debor D&coration". The name did not exist on the
books of the bank and the account number as provided was incomplete.
Beneficiary's bank deposited the funds into an account with a very similar
number, that is, with an extra digit, of "D6cor Integration",) a name with
"adequate phonetic resemblance" with that of the named beneficiary.1 43
(c) A beneficiary's bank that received a payment order instructing payment to
"maison Inro",) which did not exist on its books, deposited the funds to an
account of "S.a.r.l. Inro" rather than to that of "Inro Corserty Ltd",)
which was in effect the intended beneficiary. 
144
Arguably, these cases went too far in denying protection to a beneficiary's
bank that made bona fide reasonable efforts to resolve an ambiguity in a
payment order containing unclear or ambiguous description of the beneficiary.
This is particularly true for the first case, and to a lesser extent the second,
where account information in the payment order provided an adequate link to
a beneficiary with a very similar name to the one in the payment order. What
has been required from banks under this case law is something that goes
beyond reasonable interpretation; rather, it is something that may approach
"strict compliance" that has been required. 145 Be it as it may, existing juris-
prudence thus seems to suggest that practically, other than in the case of
insignificant ambiguity, a beneficiary's bank receiving a payment order con-
taining unclear or ambiguous description of the beneficiary is to be advised to
reject it rather than to attempt to resolve the ambiguity. Obviously, what level
of ambiguity makes it "significant" may, in many instances, be in the eyes of
the beholder.
In any event, a case of a payment order identifying a beneficiary by account
number and name other than that of the account holder may be dealt with as a
special case of unclear and ambiguous payment orders. The principal issue
involved is whether the beneficiary's bank is required to spot the inconsistency
and either reject the payment order or seek sender's clarifications or whether it
is protected when acting on either the name or number. 1
46
A duty to determine the consistency between the name and account number
of the beneficiary can be rationalised easily by reference to the position of the
beneficiary's bank as a mandatary or agent. Furthermore, at first blush, auto-
143 Belgian case of Frablemar Mons 13 fevrier 1984 49, as outlined by Bruyneel (n 140) 439, and
Thunis (n 140) 142 n 55. Arguably, the case was distinguishable from Tafreschi (n 130), in which
ambiguity referred only to number but not name.
144 Swiss case, ATF 18 11 239 (1964). In support of the decision and against the reasonableness of
the decision by the beneficiary's bank it may nevertheless be pointed out that payment was
marked as referring to transactions that took place after the account holder had ceased, to the
knowledge of the beneficiary's bank, to carry out business.
145 For an intermediary bank in a credit transfer, the "strict compliance" standard, borrowed from
the law of letters of credit, was specifically rejected in Royal Products (n 40) 199. For "strict
compliance" as "[o]ne of the cornerstones of the law relating to letters of credit" see eg Hugo
Documentary Credits: The Laii Relating to Documentary Credits f1rom a South African
Perspective writh Special Reference to the Position of the Issuing and Confirming Banks (LLD
thesis Stellenbosch 1996) 114. In Canada, a beneficiary's bank was required to meet the "strict
compliance" standard in identifying a beneficiary whose description was clear and
unambiguous. See Clansmen Resources Ltd v Toronto Dominion Bank (19 Dec 1988) 86/00047
(BCSC); aff'd on other grounds (1990) 43 BCLR (2d) 273 (CA).
146 The ensuing discussion closely follows Geva Bank Collections (n 8) 536-550.
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mated processing based on number alone appears to be inconsistent with the
duty of the beneficiary's bank to carry out the originator's presumed intention.
The latter is likely to be better reflected in the name rather than in the number
that is prone to be designed only to assist the direction of the funds to the
intended beneficiary identified by name. This is particularly true for an origi-
nator's payment order given in writing rather than electronically. In Germany,
the prevailing view is that by executing the originator's written payment order
by issuing its own electronic payment order, a bank may not alter the origina-
tor's fundamental expectations that the credit transfer be carried out as man-
ifested by the originator's intention, so that the bene-ficiary's bank does not
become free from its duty to reconcile name and number. This precludes num-
ber-based automated processing and requires the direction of funds to the
account of the named beneficiary.
At the same time in Germany, the issuance of the originator's payment order
in electronic format is taken to demonstrate the originator's agreement as to
the impact of automated processing. Only under such circumstances is the
originator seen as relinquishing any reliance on the reconciliation by the ben-
eficiary's bank between name and number so as to constitute a valid waiver.147
Clearing rules and interbank agreements may, however, release a benefi-
ciary's bank from the duty to find errors and inconsistencies and authorise
number-based automated processing. In such a case, loss caused by non-pay-
ment to the intended named beneficiary is to be allocated to the sending bank.
Such arrangements exist in Germany,44 Belgium, 4 9 as well as possibly in the
United Kingdom in CHAPS, 150 and under the LVTS by-law in Canada. 151 In
Holland, for large value domestic transfers, matching is undertaken by the
clearing house. 52 There is, however, no consensus as to the impact of such
arrangements on the originator, who is not a party to any such interbank
agreement, and whether loss may be allocated to the originator by contract,
153
particularly by having such arrangements incorporated into banking standard
form contracts.
All this is premised on the existence of a duty by the beneficiary's bank to
match name and number, so that the debate focuses on whether and how such
a duty may be contracted out of. At the same time, the very existence of such a
147 See Schimansky et al Bankrechts-Handbuch (1997) 882-885 (in German. I relied on an unofficial
translation.)
141 (n 147).
149 See Thunis (n 140) 143-144.
150 Prior to the current NewCHAPS configuration as a combined service for sterling and euro
payments, CHAPS Sterling Rule 4(f) (1999) effectively released the beneficiary's bank from the
undertaking to check compatibility between name and number. The matter is not addressed in
the current NewCHAPS Rules.
151 no 7 PC 1998 -568, s 49.
152 See Berkvens and Van Esch "Netherlands" in Effros (ed) Payment Systems of the World 241
(1994) 272. According to a co-author's clarification given to me, if a mismatch between a name
and a number is established, advice is given by the clearing house to the beneficiary's bank
which is then to decide itself whether the discrepancy is merely a matter of a typographical
error, namely, whether this is merely a matter of a misspelling of a name, or whether it is indeed
a matter of a named beneficiary who is not the holder of the numbered account.
153 For a Belgian case holding the originator bound by such a rule, see Thunis (n 140) 144-147. For
the prevailing view to the contrary in Germany, see Schimansky (n 147) 882-883. In the UK,
current CHAPS Rules specifically say they do not benefit customers but are silent as to whether
they bind them. See CHAPS Rule 10.1 (2002).
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duty may nevertheless be put to question in an electronic environment of which
participants are cognisant. Indeed, much can be said in the electronic age in
favour of automated processing, and the resulting efficiency gains in auto-
mated systems, of which participants in a credit transfer ought to be aware,
so as to maintain their own precautions in issuing accurate payment orders.
Accordingly, the originator's knowledge of possible automated processing
ought to be taken as recognition that the account number is the determinative
factor in manifesting the intention as to the beneficiary's identification, regard-
less of whether the originator's own payment order is issued in writing or in
electronic form. It is arguable then that the obligations of the beneficiary's
bank as mandatary or agent are to be delineated pursuant to that newly for-
mulated originator's intention, so that there is no room for an obligation to
match beneficiary's name and account number.
Jurisprudence on this point has not set a clear course. A Canadian case from
Quebec involving an inconsistency between the name and account number
identifying the beneficiary is Koridon Inc v JWI Ltd.154 Unfortunately, the issue
concerning the obligation of the beneficiary's bank to match and ensure that
consistency existed between the beneficiary's name and account number was
bypassed there.
155
154 [1988] AQ No 888 (CAQ).
155 In that case, a buyer of goods was instructed by the seller's fraudulent officer to pay the price
into a designated bank account identified by the officer as belonging to the seller. In fact the
account belonged to a company controlled by the fraudulent officer. Having attempted to send
a payment order identifying the payee as the seller and instructing payment into the designated
bank account, the originator's bank proceeded, the next day, and sent an amendment changing
the beneficiary's name to that of the company controlled by the seller's fraudulent officer.
Payment was carried out accordingly. The buyer successfully defended the seller's action for the
price of the goods on the basis of the payment to the company controlled by the seller's
fraudulent officer. No evidence was produced to explain the amendment to the payment order
changing the beneficiary's name. The court concluded, however, that this must have happened
upon compliance with the fraudulent officer's instructions given either directly to the
originator's bank or to the buyer. While the report is silent on the point, this must have
occurred following the rejection by the beneficiary's bank of the first payment order, identifying
the seller as the beneficiary and instructing payment to an account belonging to the officer's
company. The case thus appears to involve a beneficiary's bank (though the report speaks of a
"banking network" ("rseau bancaire") into which the messages of the originator's banks were
sent, such a network must be regarded as a processor acting for the beneficiary's bank) that
verified the consistency between the name and account number of the beneficiary indicated in
the first payment order and that moved on to reject it once it found that the beneficiary's name
and account number did not match. In the facts of the case, both the seller and the company
controlled by the seller's fraudulent officer had accounts with the beneficiary's bank, though in
different branches. This, however, did not affect the result. However, the judgment is silent on
whether this was in discharge of a duty to match name and number fastened on the beneficiary's
bank. It is however interesting (though unlikely to be material in determining the law on this
point) to note that, according to the evidence, in the absence of fraud involving the beneficiary's
bank and one seeking to misdirect funds, the seller's president "found it impossible to believe
that any Bank would deposit a sum in which the beneficiary did not correspond to the account".
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In South Africa, a discussion on the issue was avoided in First National Bank
v Quality Tyres.156 On the other hand, a Swiss case 157 appears to be directly to
the point. A beneficiary's bank received a payment order identifying the ben-
eficiary both by name and account number. In fact, the account did not belong
to the named beneficiary. The beneficiary's bank complied with the account
holder's instructions and directed the funds to the specified account. Judgment
was given against the beneficiary's bank, which wrongfully relied on informa-
tion emanating not from its sender, but rather, from a customer claiming to be
the beneficiary, which in fact was not intended by the originator to receive
funds. Rather, the originator was fraudulently induced to make payment to a
specified account, misrepresented to the originator as belonging to the named
beneficiary, and not the actual account holder. The court held that a benefi-
ciary's bank was not free to act on the basis of the account number alone, and
in nevertheless so acting, it broke its due diligence obligation as a mandatary.
It however seems to me that the case falls short of undermining automated
processing, since in the facts of the case, the beneficiary's bank acquired knowl-
edge of the inconsistency between name and number, and chose to believe its
customer and act on the customer's instructions. Stated otherwise, the case
ought not to be taken as fastening on the beneficiary's bank an obligation to
match a name and number; the court merely held that once knowledge of the
156 1995 3 SA 556. In that case, Senbank was instructed by Philip, a director of Quality Tyres, to
provide funds under a credit facility available to Quality Tyres from Senbank, by making out a
cheque payable to Quality Tyres and having it deposited at Quality Tyres' account with FNB
Parktown branch. The cheque, drawn by Senbank on Trust Bank, and made out payable to
Quality Tyres, was forwarded for collection by Senbank to FNB Bred Street branch, which was
situated close to Senbank's premises, and with which Senbank customarily did its banking. The
cheque was accompanied by a credit transfer form signed by Senbank instructing FNB
Parktown branch to credit Quality Tyres' account which was further identified in the credit
transfer form by number, supplied by Philip. In fact, Quality Tyres had no account with FNB,
and the designated account was controlled by Philip personally. From FNB branch, the cheque
and the credit transfer form were forwarded to the FNB's centralised bookkeeping centre. The
credit transfer form was processed through a machine which caused the account identified by
number to be credited with the amount of the cheque. The cheque was passed through the
normal automated clearing process, paid by the drawee Trust Bank and returned to the drawer
Senbank. Neither the cheque nor the credit transfer form passed through FNB Parktown
branch. At all relevant times, this was the only location where the payee's name and designated
account number could be matched. Ultimately, Philip embezzled the funds so credited to his
account. Quality Tyres sued FNB for the loss, purporting to bring the action as a "true owner"
claiming from a collecting bank. The action failed on the theory that, in the facts of the case and
under general law, ownership in the cheque never passed to Quality Tyres, and always remained
with Senbank. (But this overlooks the possibility of a constructive delivery of the cheque by
Senbank to Quality Tyres. See Geva Bank Collections (n 8) 442 n 80, and in general for the
action of the "true owner" against the collecting bank in South Africa 452-456.) In the course of
the judgment, the court consistently treated the credit transfer form as a deposit slip. Thus, the
case was not treated as a credit transfer to the beneficiary, under which the originator's bank
paid the beneficiary's bank by cheque. Rather, it was treated as involving the collection of a
cheque payable to the payee, which in fact, looks appropriate in the circumstances,
notwithstanding the unorthodox form of the "deposit slip". Nevertheless, it is noteworthy
that, had there been no cheque payable to the payee, payment to the beneficiary would have
been effected by means of a credit transfer executed by a payment order issued by Senbank and
instructing FNB to pay into Quality Tyres' account identified by number (designating in fact an
account controlled by Philip). The issue of the duty of the beneficiary's bank, here FNB, to
verify consistency between beneficiary's name and number, would have then arisen.
157 BGE/ATF 126 Ill 20 (1999), unofficial translation to French [2000] La Semainejudiciaire 251
(Swiss federal court 17 Dec 1999)
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inconsistency has been acquired, the bank is not free to overlook it. As will be
seen below, this is also the position adopted by the drafters of UCC article 4A.
American common law was more decisive. Bradford Trust Co of Boston v
Texas American Bank involved unauthorised instructions issued to the origi-
nator's bank and containing inconsistent name and account number for the
beneficiary. 5 8 Loss was allocated to the originator's bank. That bank did not
follow its own internal procedures to verify the genuineness of an unauthorised
payment order. The payment order identified the destination account at the
beneficiary's bank by number, as well as by the name of the purported origi-
nator. In fact, the numbered account belonged to the impostor's innocent
creditor. This negligence of the originator's bank, and not the failure by the
beneficiary's bank to notice the discrepancy between name and number, was
held to be the ultimate cause of the loss. However, where the originator's
payment order was genuine, the standard risk bearer under pre-article 4A
American common law was the beneficiary's bank. The leading case is Secu-
rities Fund Services Inc v American National Bank and Trust Co of Chicago.
159
In that case, the beneficiary's bank was required to exercise care so as to notice
a discrepancy between the account number and the beneficiary's name. Having
failed to do so, it became liable to the originator. The originator could also sue
the beneficiary's bank as a third party beneficiary of the undertaking by the
beneficiary's bank to deliver funds as directed, as well as the principal who was
injured by the negligence of his sub-agent (the beneficiary's bank).
In contrast, the Secretariat of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) took the position that "the development of a
fast, reliable and inexpensive electronic funds transfer system could clearly be
furthered by enabling banks to rely entirely upon the account number in the
funds transfer instruction" 160 so that "a bank that entered a ... credit according
to the account number on a funds transfer instruction it received would not be
liable even though the entry was made to an account bearing a different name
from that on the instruction".
161
Originally, however, the drafters of UCC article 4A were reluctant to go all
that far. Rather, under the 1987 draft of section 4A-207(6), processing based
on number alone accorded protection to a beneficiary's bank only in connec-
tion with a payment order "transmitted [to it] by use of a standard machine-
readable format",) and only towards any sender with notice that "payment will
be made on the identifying or bank account number". This was an exception to
the general rule under the 1987 draft of section 4A-207(5), under which the
acceptance by the beneficiary's bank by means of payment into the designated
account that did not belong to the named beneficiary was invalid.
162
Ultimately, the drafters of article 4A endorsed the UNCITRAL position. As
151 (n 76).
159 (n 5).
1 60 Secretariat of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Legal
Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers (1987) 37.
161 (n 160) 128.
162 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Uniform Commercial Code
Article 4A -Wire Transfers (28 Sep 1987, draft for discussion only). For the UNCITRAL
position, the early draft of UCC article 4A, and pre-article 4A case law, see Koh "Liability for
lost or stolen funds in cases of name and number -discrepancies in wire transfers: analysis of the
approaches taken in the United States and internationally" 1989 Cornell lnt L J 91.
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finally adopted, UCC article4A-207(b) deals with the position of a beneficiary's
bank receiving a payment order identifying the beneficiary "both by name and
by an identifying or bank account" where "the name and number identify
different persons". 163 Explicitly declining to apply to such a payment order
the general rule governing a payment order payable to an "unidentifiable"
beneficiary, provided by subsection (a),' 64 subsection (b)(1), in the footsteps
of UNCITRAL, allows a beneficiary's bank receiving inconsistent instructions
to rely solely "on the number as the proper identification of the beneficiary of
the order,"165 provided that the beneficiary's bank did not know that the name
and number refer to different persons. "The beneficiary's bank need not de-
termine whether the name and number refer to the same person." 
166
Official Comment 2 to section4A-207 explains that "[s]ubsection (b) allows
banks to utilize automated processing by allowing banks to act on the basis of
the number without regard to the name if the bank does not know that the
name and number refer to different persons". The underlying automated pro-
cessing environment is described in the comment as follows:
"A very large percentage of payment orders issued to the beneficiary's bank by another bank are
processed by automated means using machines capable of reading orders on standard formats
that identify the beneficiary by an identifying number or the number of a bank account. The
processing of the order by the beneficiary's bank and the crediting of the beneficiary's account
are done by use of the identifying or bank account number without human reading of the
payment order itself. The process is comparable to that used in automated payment of checks."
Indeed, the drafters were quite cognisant of the fact that "[t]he standard format
...may also allow the inclusion of the name of the beneficiary and other
information which can be useful to the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary".
However, such information "plays no part in the process of payment". As a
matter of fact, the drafters did not deny that a beneficiary's bank which has
both number and name can determine the inconsistency; however, their con-
clusion was that "if a duty to make that determination is imposed on the
beneficiary's bank the benefits of automated payment are lost". According
to comment 2:
"Manual handling of payment orders is both expensive and subject to human error. If payment
orders can be handled on an automated basis there are substantial economies of operation and
the possibility of clerical error is reduced."'
167
163 Notwithstanding General Electric Capital Corp i' Central Bank 49 F 3d 280 (7th Cir 1995), the
provision does not cover a payment order received by the beneficiary's bank identifying the
beneficiary by name only, even where the account number has been omitted by the sending
intermediary bank due to its own error.
164 For UCC section 4A-207(a), see text around n 126-128 above.
165 This position is implemented in the USA by interbank electronic networks. See eg s 4.1.4 of the
Operating Rules of the National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) (2003
ACH Rules), as well as s 5(b) of Administrative Procedures Clearing House Interbank
Payments System (CHIPS) (CHIPS Rules and Administrative -Procedures Jan 2003).
166 UCC 4A 207(b)(1). No similar protection is afforded under UCC articles 3 and 4 to a
depositary bank that misdirected proceeds of a check on the basis of an incorrect lock box
identification number placed on a cheque that contained the correct name of the payee. See
Continental Airlines Inc v Boatmen's National Bank of St Louis 13 F 3d 1254 (8th Cir 1994).
However, in part, the decision was based on lack of knowledge by the payee (and payor) of the
consequences of automated processing (n 165) 1260. CfUCC par 4A-207(c).
167 Official Comment 2 to UCC section 4A-207.
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In any event, section 4A-207(b) is not limited to actual cases of automated
processing. "A bank that processes by semi-automated means or even manu-
ally may [nevertheless] rely on number as stated in section 4A-207."' 168
Under section 4A-207(b)(2), protection is afforded to a beneficiary's bank
acting on the basis of the name only, rather than on the account number only
where the named beneficiary "was entitled to receive payment from the origi-
nator of the funds transfer". 169 Protection for payment to the rightful bene-
ficiary is also given to the beneficiary's bank under subsection (b)(2) where it
knows that "the name and number identify different persons". In effect, under
subsections (b)(1) and (2), where a payment order received by the beneficiary's
bank identifies the beneficiary both by name and by an identifying number, the
beneficiary of the order is the account holder, unless the beneficiary's bank
knows that the name and number identify different persons.
On the other hand, where the beneficiary's bank knows that the name and
number identify different persons it may not rely on the number as the proper
identification of the beneficiary. In such a case, under subsection (b)(2), "no
person has rights as beneficiary except the person paid by the beneficiary's
bank if that person was entitled to receive payment from the originator of
the funds transfer". Otherwise, where "no person has rights as beneficiary",
the rule under subsection (b)(2) is that "acceptance of the order cannot occur".
Under UCC section 1-201(26), "knowledge" is "actual knowledge". Under
UCC section 1 201(27), for an organisation such as a bank, knowledge is
effective for a particular transaction "from the time when it is brought to
the attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event,
from the time when it would have been brought to his attention if the organi-
zation had exercised due diligence". Due diligence requires the maintenance of
"reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the person
conducting the transaction" as well as "reasonable compliance with the rou-
tines".' 70 It follows that knowledge by somebody at the bank, other than
someone processing the payment order, does not taint the bank with knowl-
edge. Furthermore, in an automated processing setting, it is not expected that
knowledge of inconsistency between a name and number should be discovered
through any interdepartmental communication. Ignorance by those processing
payment orders is likely to achieve the desired result of lack of knowledge as to
any discrepancy between a name and number.
Subsection (b)(1) is broad enough to protect a beneficiary's bank that does
not act automatically on the basis of the account number, as long as the bank
paid the designated account without knowledge that it did not belong to the
named beneficiary. An analysis of a non-UCC article 4A case may serve as a
good example. In Royal Bank of Canada v Stangl,17 1 the beneficiary's bank
received a payment order directing payment at a designated branch to Lynwil
International Trading Inc, account no 916327. However, to the knowledge of
that branch, this account belonged to another entity, Unitec, that had several
accounts at that branch, one of which (no 627902) was in the name of Linwell
International. Having consulted Unitec, and relying on past experience, includ-
161 (n 167).
169 UCC s 4A-207(b)(2). In theory, this may even be broader than the intended beneficiary.




ing on the provenance of the funds transfer, the branch deposited the funds
into one of Unitec's accounts. In fact, the intended beneficiary was Lynwil, a
different entity that had no account at that branch. 1
72
At first blush, the application of section 4A-207(b) to this situation is un-
clear. Indeed, the beneficiary's bank might have assumed that "Lynwil" was a
misspelling of "Linwell",) so that the bank "[did] not know that the name and
number refer[red] to different persons," as envisaged by subsection (b)(1).
Nonetheless, was payment made in reliance on the number (subsection
(b)(1)), or to "the person [mistakenly] identified by name" (subsection
(b)(2))? This may be a question of fact; however, in the final analysis, inasmuch
as payment was made to the holder of account no 916327, as instructed in the
payment order, and in the absence of knowledge by the beneficiary's bank of
the discrepancy between the name and number, that bank should be protected
under subsection (b)(1).
A recent decision in the United States appears to support this analysis of
Stangl under UCC article 4A, but at the same time, to point out a weakness in
the plain language of section 4A-207(b). In New South Federal Saving Bank v
Flatbush Federal and Savings and Loan Association of Brooklyn three payment
orders received at different times by the beneficiary's bank identified the ben-
eficiary by the same account number. 7 3 In each case the beneficiary's bank
entered the number into its system and found that the account belonged to one
Femi Ingold, a name that was part of the named beneficiary in each of the three
payment orders. Thus, the first payment order identified the beneficiary by
name as "ROBERT PLAN INC FBO 17 4 FEMI INGOLD ULTIMATE NET-
WORK". The second payment order identified the beneficiary by name as
"ROBERT PLAN CORPORATION" but named "FEMI INGOLD ULTI-
MATE NETWORK" under "originator to beneficiary information". The
third and last payment order named as beneficiary "ROBERT PLAN INC
FC-FEMI INGOLD ULTIMATE NETWORK".
The court was inclined to conclude that "FEMI INGOLD ULTIMATE
NETWORK",) which appeared in each payment order, was Femi Ingold's
trade name, and not a separate entity. This however does not settle the appli-
cation of section 4A-207(b)(1); what matters under that provision is not
whether the account holder and the Network are in fact "different persons";)
rather, what matters is lack of knowledge by the beneficiary's bank that they
are. Indeed, "knowledge" is defined in section 1-201(25) in terms of "actual
knowledge",) 175 and in the facts of the case, no such knowledge was proved to
172 Under the common law, in a non-article 4A jurisdiction, judgment was given in favour of the
intermediary bank against both the beneficiary's bank and Unitec. Unitec failed to assert any
restitutionary defence to the action for the recovery of the mistaken payment. Under such
circumstances, both the common law and article 4A warrant the judgment against Unitec.
Judgment was given against the beneficiary's bank on the basis of its negligence. For a critique
on the judgment against the beneficiary's bank on the basis that it was plausible for the
beneficiary's bank to believe that the beneficiary's name was misspelled and not that it referred
to someone other than the account holder, see Geva "Ambiguous wire instructions: Royal Bank
of Canada r Stangl" 1995 Can Bus LJ 435. In the facts of the case, the funds originated from
mining operations in Guyana, of the type from which also the account holder received payments
in the past. In my view this lent further support to the reasonableness of the action by the
beneficiary's bank.
17' 2003 WL 1888678 (SDNY Apr 15, 2003)
174 meaning "for the benefit of".
17 This is acknowledged by Official comment 2 to s 4A-207.
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exist. 17 6 On this basis, the court held that the beneficiary's bank was protected
under section 4A-207(b)(1) so that its acceptance was effective.
Nevertheless in the facts of the case, "Femi Ingold Ultimate Network"
consistently appeared in each payment order in conjunction with Robert
Plan Inc or Corporation, presumably the originator. Had there not been a
designation of an account by number that in effect belonged to Femi Ingold,
the payment orders could have been interpreted as instructing payment to
Robert Plan, even if perhaps jointly with Femi Ingold. The court might be
taken to suppose that the designation of the account number that actually
belonged to one who was part of the beneficiary's name supported the reason-
ableness of the action by the beneficiary's bank. At the same time, there is
nothing in the language of section 4A-207(b) to require that interpretation by
the beneficiary's bank of the payment order ought to be reasonable. That is,
what is required under the provision is lack of actual knowledge; in the facts of
the case, doubts as to the references in the payment orders to the Network and
originator as part of the named beneficiary did not amount to knowledge that
the named beneficiary is other than the account holder.
The latter interpretation of section 4A-207(b)(1) is bothersome. True, pro-
tecting a beneficiary's bank acting on the number without knowledge of the
inconsistency, though rationalised on the basis of the efficiency of automated
processing, the provision is not so limited in its scope. 177 Nevertheless, section
4A-207(b)(1) ought not be read as protecting a beneficiary's bank acting on an
unreasonable identification of the beneficiary based on the interpretation of the
payment order. In the facts of the case, we do not know whether the benefi-
ciary's bank had actual doubts as to who was the named beneficiary; we do
know though that, from the information available at its disposal, the bank
should have had doubts, as processing was not automated. On policy grounds,
the court's failure to determine the reasonableness of the bank's interpretation
and specifically link the ultimate decision to such reasonableness is thus un-
satisfactory.
In Stangl doubts as to the exact spelling of the beneficiary's name did not
amount to knowledge that the named beneficiary and the account holder were
different persons. In this respect, it is no different from Flatbush, where doubts
as to the identity of the named beneficiary did not amount to knowledge that
the named beneficiary and the account holder were different persons. 178 At the
same time, the identification of the named beneficiary as "Linwell" in Stangl
appears to me to be even more reasonable than the identification of the named
beneficiary as "Femi Ingold" in Flatbush. Flatbush thus demonstrates that,
particularly when processing is not automated, there is a grey area between
176 Since in the facts of the case all relevant information was available to "the individual conducting
the transaction" at the beneficiary's bank no issue arose under s 1-202(27), dealing with notice,
knowledge or notice, knowledge or notification received by an organisation.
177 See Official comment 2 to s 4A-207.
178 While unlike in Stangl, actual error, namely different intention by the originator, was not said to
exist in Flatbush, this ought not to have affected the question concerning the interpretation of s
4A-207(b)(1). It is the action of the beneficiary's bank on the basis of an account number that
belonged to one who could reasonably be viewed as the named beneficiary that ought to have
afforded the protection of the provision in Stangl as in Flatbush.
TSAR 2004.2[ISSN 0257-7747]
GEVA
knowledge and lack of knowledge as to whether name and number identify the
same beneficiary. In such a case, the reasonable identification test ought to
apply. It may however well be that to secure the acceptance of such interpreta-
tion a clarifying amendment to section 4A-207(b) is to be recommended.
As for Gilbey, the judgment does not tell us whether processing at Trust
Bank was automated. Had it been automated, Trust Bank would have been
protected under section 4A-207(b), in which case any ambiguity in the name of
the beneficiary (that is either "Trust Bank" or "Trust bank (Gilbeys)") would
not have been relevant. Moreover, per the preceding analysis, irrespective of
whether processing was automated or not, even actual knowledge by Trust
Bank of the ambiguity would not necessarily have amounted to actual knowl-
edge that the beneficiary was other than "Fundstrust",) at least as long as this
was on the basis of a reasonable interpretation of the payment order.
7 Conclusion
Had UCC article 4A applied in Gilbey, Gilbeys would not have had a direct
cause of action against Trust Bank. It could have nevertheless recovered from
FNB, either where Trust Bank had known that the payment order it had
received identified the beneficiary by inconsistent name and number, or where
FNB had not advised it of the possibility of processing at Trust Bank on the
basis of number alone. FNB could have recovered from Trust Bank only in the
former instance, that of acceptance by Trust Bank on the basis of number but
with knowledge that it did not belong to the named beneficiary.
Outside UCC article 4A, existing jurisprudence does not provide unequivo-
cal direct support for such a scheme. Nevertheless, the better view calls for the
recognition or adoption, even without legislative intervention, of a rule provid-
ing for the adequacy of processing by a beneficiary's bank on the basis of
account number, where it acts without knowledge of inconsistency between
name and number. After all, such a rule was adopted by legislation in response
to the exigencies of commerce and hence is amenable to be developed by courts
themselves as a matter of modern 'law merchant.'
Fastening on the beneficiary's bank an obligation to match name and num-
ber and verify consistency between them will discourage automation in the
processing of payment orders. Conversely, allowing a beneficiary's bank direct-
ing payment to rely exclusively on account number will go beyond reaping the
efficiency benefits of automated processing in terms of speeding the processing
of payments. 7 It will also release the beneficiary's bank from the burden of
dealing with, and passing judgment on, ambiguities in the name, an area in
which, to date, jurisprudence has been quite hostile to beneficiary's banks.
1 8 0
That is, matching name and number may disclose not only whether the account
belongs to the named beneficiary, but also that the name is misspelled so that
there are doubts whether the account belongs to the beneficiary. To that end,
placing on the beneficiary's bank an excessive burden, or a too high standard
approaching strict compliance, will serve only to increase litigation as well as
179 as described in text at n 159-167.
"0 See text at n 141-145 (under law other than UCC article 4A) and 128-130 (for article 4A
jurisprudence).
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the rejection rate of payment orders, and hence, will undermine the efficacy of
the wire transfer payment.
True, what appears to me, at present, as an unjustifiably rigid state of law
concerning the duties of a beneficiary's bank in ascertaining the meaning of
unclear or ambiguous instructions, is not engraved in stone; the emergence of
greater flexibility by court decisions is still an attainable objective. Indeed, a
recent American case protecting the beneficiary's bank against a possible error
in its interpretation of the named beneficiary, as long as it credited the desig-
nated account, 18 1 may signal that such flexibility is just around the corner, at
least in the context of the construction of UCC section 4A-207(b)(1). Yet, it is
obvious that releasing a beneficiary's bank from the duty to match name and
number, namely, adopting the rule of that provision, is likely to significantly
reduce the magnitude of the issue. Thus, where there is no duty to match name
and number, processing may be carried out on the basis of the number alone;
under such circumstances, the discovery of ambiguity in the name is less likely
to happen. All this may be taken into account by courts, and not only the
legislature, in determining applicable law.
Without the benefit of legislation it is more difficult to expect courts to adopt
a "money-back guarantee" rule in lieu of recovery on the basis of breach of
duty. Yet, as the judgment given in Gilbey demonstrates, as a matter of doc-
trine, recovery by the originator in case of breach by a beneficiary's bank is not
a simple matter. Direct privity between the originator and the beneficiary's
bank is not straightforward; in fact it was rejected by the court in Gilbey. At
the same time, as indicated, it may be problematic to fasten on the originator's
bank vicarious liability for breach by the beneficiary's bank, a sub-agent no-
minated by the originator.
I submit that liability for "money-back guarantee" may be fastened on an
originator's bank on the basis of an implied term in its contract with theorNevertheless, in the final analysis, the best response to risksorginator.-Neeteesinteinlaayitebsrepneorsk
posed by legal uncertainty18 3 is a comprehensive legislative solution. Require-
ments and needs of participants in modern payment systems are best met by a
modern statute; though not without the need for further fine-tuning, article
4A-type legislation is thus the most appropriate response to issues raised in
Gilbey. Indeed, no given solution is perfect; i s4 yet comprehensive legislation is
the best way to assure that the law will keep up with the pace of technological
and business developments.
181 See text around n 173-176.
182 Such a term may be viewed as a "necessity" so as to satisfy the test of implying terms in a
contract under Liverpool City Council v Iriwin [1977] AC 239 254. Without such a term, if there is
no privity between the originator and the beneficiary's bank and the originator's bank is not
vicariously liable for the default of the beneficiary's bank, the originator will remain with no
remedy for the default by the beneficiary's bank.
183 Legal risk, that is, the risk of a poor legal framework or legal uncertainties, was identified,
though primarily in the context of clearing and settlement, as one of four risks that can arise in
payment systems. To that end, the first core principle for systematically important payment
systems requires a well-founded legal basis for a system. See Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems Core Principles fr Systematically Important Payment Systems Report ("
the Task Force on Payment System Principles and Practices (Basel: Bank for International
Settlement, Jan 2001).





DIE BEGUNSTIGDE SE BANK EN DIE BEGUNSTIGDE BESKRYF DEUR NAAM EN
NOMMER: AANSPREEKLIKHEIDSKETTING EN AANSPREEKLIKHEIDSTANDAARD
IN FONDSOORDRAGTE
Die artikel handel oor aspekte rondom die identifikasie van die begunstigde in die laaste
betalingsopdrag in 'n kredietoordrag ontvang deur die laaste bank in die oordragketting (die
begunstigde se bank), die pligte van die begunstigde se bank in geval van 'n dubbelsinnige
beskrywing van die begunstigde in die betalingsopdrag en die aanspreeklikheid van die begunstigde
se bank in geval van pligsversuim. 'n Begunstigde kan in 'n betalingsopdrag aangedui word by wyse
van naam, rekeningnommer, of beide. Die outeur bespreek die ongerapporteerde Suid-Afrikaanse
saak Gilbev Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd en ondersoek hoe die saak hanteer
sou word in terme van artikel 4A van die Uniorm Commercial Code. Die pligte van die begunstigde
se bank met betrekking tot onduidelike of dubbelsinnige instruksies word vervolgens bespreek. Die
outeur doen aan die hand dat die behoeftes van deelnemers aan moderne betalingstelsels verkieslik
deur moderne wetgewing bevredig moet word. Wetgewing soos artikel 4A, met die nodige
wysigings, sou die mees gepaste oplossing vir die geskilpunte in die Gilbey-saak wees.
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